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Abstract—Low transaction throughput and poor scalability
are significant issues in public blockchain consensus protocols
such as Bitcoins. Recent research efforts in this direction have
proposed shard-based consensus protocols where the key idea is
to split the transactions among multiple committees (or shards),
which then process these shards or set of transactions in parallel.
Such a parallel processing of disjoint sets of transactions or
shards by multiple committees significantly improves the overall
scalability and transaction throughout of the system. However,
one significant research gap is a lack of understanding of the
strategic behavior of rational processors within committees in
such shard-based consensus protocols. Such an understanding
is critical for designing appropriate incentives that will foster
cooperation within committees and prevent free-riding. In this
paper, we address this research gap by analyzing the behavior of
processors using a game-theoretic model, where each processor
aims at maximizing its reward at a minimum cost of participating
in the protocol. We first analyze the Nash equilibria in an N -
player static game model of the sharding protocol. We show that
depending on the reward sharing approach employed, processors
can potentially increase their payoff by unilaterally behaving in
a defective fashion, thus resulting in a social dilemma. In order
to overcome this social dilemma, we propose a novel incentive-
compatible reward sharing mechanism to promote cooperation
among processors. Our numerical results show that achieving a
majority of cooperating processors (required to ensure a healthy
state of the blockchain network) is easier to achieve with the
proposed incentive-compatible reward sharing mechanism than
with other reward sharing mechanisms.
I. INTRODUCTION
A blockchain is an append-only, immutable distributed
database that records a time-sequenced history of facts called
transactions. Transactions are typically grouped into blocks,
and the blockchain protocol enables the construction and main-
tenance of consistent copies of the cryptographic hash-chain
of blocks in a distributed fashion. The first blockchain protocol
was introduced in 2009 by Satoshi Nakamoto to support the
Bitcoin cryptocurrency [1]. A key aspect of this protocol is the
consensus algorithm (also sometimes referred in the literature
as Nakamoto consensus) which enables agreement among a
network of processors or miners on the state of the blockchain
(identified by its cryptographic digest), under the assumption
that a fraction of them could be malicious or faulty. In
addition to this, as Bitcoin’s blockchain is permissionless, i.e.,
no trusted infrastructure to establish verifiable identities for
processors exists or is assumed, consensus on the blockchain’s
state cannot be achieved using standard distributed Byzantine
fault-tolerant consensus algorithms in the literature. In such
a permissionless setting, the blockchain protocol selects (ran-
domly and in an unbiased fashion) one processor once every
10 minutes on average (epoch), and this selected processor
gets the right to commit (or append) a new block onto the
blockchain. The network (other processors) implicitly accept
this block by building on top of it in the next epoch or reject
it by building on top of some other block in the hash-chain.
Consensus in Bitcoin is thus long-term, i.e., a block is said
to be included in the blockchain if it is part of the longest
valid blockchain and has received a significant number of
confirmations1. The Bitcoin protocol uses a Proof-of-Work
(PoW) mechanism to select the leader (processor with the
right to commit a block) in each epoch in an unbiased
fashion, which is nothing but a hash puzzle that each processor
attempts to solve - one that succeeds is selected and gets the
right to propose the next block. As PoW involves significant
computation, Bitcoin’s protocol includes a reward mechanism
to incentivize processors to compete (in a fair fashion) and to
behave honestly. As of July 2018 [2], there were a total of
1624 cryptocurrencies, a significant number of which use the
same code base as Bitcoin or are directly inspired by Bitcoin’s
distributed consensus algorithm. The use of blockchains and
blockchain-based distributed consensus, however, is not just
restricted to cryptocurrencies. Systems that can host and ex-
ecute arbitrary distributed applications (commonly referred to
as “smart contracts”) over a single public permissionless hash-
chain, for example, Ethereum [3], have also become popular.
Such systems also employ a Bitcoin-like Proof-of-Work based
consensus algorithm and a related cryptocurrency (e.g., Ether
in Ethereum) to incentivize processors or miners to participate
honestly in the consensus process.
Despite its tremendous popularity, one significant short-
coming of Bitcoin’s consensus protocol (and of similar pub-
lic permissionless blockchain systems) is its low transaction
throughput and poor scalability. With an average inter-block
time of 10 minutes and a maximum block size of 10 MB,
Bitcoin’s transaction rate is currently only 7 transactions per
second [4]. Similarly, Ethereum can support only roughly 20
transactions per second. This is significantly lower than the
transaction rates afforded by centralized transaction processing
1Number of blocks added on top of the block in question in the longest
valid blockchain.
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2systems. For instance, PayPal can process more than 450
transactions per second while VisaNet can process anywhere
between 1667 and 56,000 transactions per second [4]. It is
clear that the current Bitcoin and Ethereum transaction rates
are not sufficient for many practical applications, and thus,
there have been significant efforts towards improving their
transaction throughputs, for example, BIP [5] and Bitcoin-NG
[6] for Bitcoin and Raiden [7] for Ethereum.
Similarly, there have been other significant efforts within
the research community towards improving the transaction
throughput and scalability of public permissionless blockchain
protocols in general. One key outcome of this line of research
is sharding [8]–[10], which proposes to periodically partition
the network of processors (in an unbiased fashion) into smaller
committees, each of which processes a disjoint set of transac-
tions (also called a shard2) in parallel with other committees.
As each committee is reasonably small, it can run a classical
Byzantine consensus protocol such as PBFT [11] to agree
on a set of transactions rather than the traditional Nakamoto
consensus of Bitcoin, thus increasing the overall transaction
throughput of the system. Although the idea of parallelizing
the tasks of transaction processing and reaching consensus (on
a set of transactions) by partitioning the processor network into
committees is promising, existing sharding proposals [8]–[10]
fail to clarify how processors will be incentivized to honestly
participate and discharge their committee duties.
Two facts about existing sharding protocols are relevant
to this discussion and should be highlighted: (i) the intra-
committee consensus algorithms (e.g., PBFT) employed by
existing protocols are inherently fault-tolerant, i.e., they will
operate correctly even in the presence of a certain number
of faulty or non-participating committee members, and (ii)
the agreed (or consensus) set of transactions within each
committee is required to be ratified (or signed) by only a
majority of the committee members in order for those to be
included into a block. Now as participation in committee tasks
(such as transaction validation, signature creation, etc.) impose
a cost on processors, it is possible that rational processors
may choose not to participate in these tasks (and get away
with it as the protocol may still succeed at the end) if their
remuneration is not appropriately determined. For example,
if each processor within a committee is equally remunerated,
a rational processor may choose to free-ride, i.e., get paid
without participating in any committee work. In summary,
one key research gap in this line of research is a lack of
understanding of the strategic behavior of rational processors
in shard-based consensus protocols for public permissionless
blockchains. Such an understanding is critical for designing
appropriate incentives that will foster cooperation within com-
mittees and prevent free-riding. Our goal in this paper is to
address this research gap.
In line with the above goal, we first model shard-based
protocols, and the interaction between processors in such
protocols, using a static non-cooperative game by systemat-
ically quantifying processor strategies in such a game and the
2Note that the committees are working inside shards in these protocols.
Hence, we use the two terms interchangeably in the paper.
resulting payoffs. We show that in such a setting, if the total
reward (received at the end of the game when a new block
is successfully committed to the blockchain) is equally or
uniformly distributed among all the participating processors,
then the resulting strategic interactions can be characterized
using a game with social dilemma, such as a public goods
game. Consequently, we show that not participating in the
committee tasks (by all processors) is a Nash equilibrium of
the game. We further show that it is impossible to enforce
a cooperative Nash equilibria in this setting unless certain
improbable conditions are met. Hence, we extend the current
game model by considering fair sharing of rewards, instead of
equal sharing, where processors receive benefits only if they
have cooperated within their shards. In this new system, we
derive the Nash equilibria and conditions under which such
an equilibria can be achieved. Although this game is still
a public goods game, we were able to establish conditions
for achieving cooperation by processors towards executing the
committee tasks in this game. These conditions can be derived
and verified by processors before they decide on their strategy
to cooperate or defect in the game. Our results show that
it is possible to achieve a cooperative equilibium in such a
fair reward sharing system. Finally, we design the incentive-
compatible reward sharing protocol that further improves upon
the fair sharing protocol by introducing a shard coordinator
who can guide individual processors to follow the optimal
strategy (cooperate or defect), based on a preview of the
shard’s consensus status in each epoch. Our numerical analysis
show that the incentive-compatible protocol can outperform
both the uniform and fair reward sharing protocols. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate the
selfish behavior of processors, and its effect, in shard-based
permissionless blockchains.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we discuss the state of the art and present a generic system
model for shard-based blockchain protocols, considering ratio-
nal processors. In Section III, we present the game model and
investigate all possible Nash equilibria under different reward
sharing schemes. In Section IV, we describe the proposed
incentive-compatible reward sharing protocol, followed by
numerical evaluations presented in Section V. Related research
efforts efforts have been outlined in Section VI. We conclude
the paper in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first generically outline details of a shard-
based approach for achieving consensus in permissionless
blockchains. Then, we formally outline the various costs
involved for participating processors. Lastly, we clarify the
rationality assumptions related to the processors.
A. Shard-based Consensus Protocol
Consider a network of N processors participating in a pub-
lic permissionless blockchain. Processors in such a network
do not have an identity assigned by a trusted third-party
or a public-key infrastructure, i.e., they use self-generated
3pseudonyms as transient identifiers. For simplifying the expo-
sition, we assume that all processors are similar to each other
in terms of computational capabilities. Further, we assume
that all processors are honest, but selfish (more details on this
will follow in section II-C).
Let time be divided into fixed-sized epochs. The network
accepts transactions in blocks, i.e., at the end of each epoch
the network accepts and commits a new block of transactions.
Any block B is composed of (or can be partitioned into)
k disjoint sets of transactions Bi, where Bi can be empty.
Each such disjoint set Bi is referred to as a shard and can
be defined based on some property(ies) of transactions within
that set, for example, least significant bits of the transaction
hash. The number of shards (k) is a variable quantity and
can grow linearly with the size of the network. The network
determines a binary validation function V , which takes as an
input a transaction (belonging to any shard) and any other data
representing the current state of the blockchain and outputs
whether the input transaction is valid or not, and all processors
have access to such a function V .
Now, given the above, a sharding or shard-based protocol
is a protocol which is run among the processors and which
outputs (at the end of each epoch) a block B containing k
disjoint shards Bi such that all honest processors agree on B
with a very high probability and all transactions within the
block B are valid (i.e., all transactions satisfy the validation
function V ). The protocol does this by splitting the network
of processors into multiple disjoint committees, where each
committee processes (validates and agrees on) a separate shard
(Bi). The main steps in the protocol execution during each
epoch is illustrated in Figure 1. Below, we summarize the main
steps involved in sharding by outlining a classical protocol
called Elastico [8]. Recent research efforts such as Omniledger
[10] provide some enhancements and additional functionalities
to the original sharding proposal in Elastico, but the key idea of
partitioning the transactions into disjoint shards and assigning
a committee of processors to process each shard in parallel
remains the same in all shard-based protocols.
A sharding protocol proceeds in epochs and in each epoch
the processors execute the following steps (in this order) [8]:
1) Committee Formation: First, each processor attempts
to generate a publicly verifiable identity by solving
some Proof-of-Work (PoW) puzzle. In other words, each
processor uses the solution of a PoW hash puzzle (i.e.,
the message digest that lies within the pre-determined
target) as an identity in that epoch. There are two
advantages of using a PoW puzzle for identity creation:
(i) network (other processors) can verify the identity and,
(ii) number of malicious sybils can be limited due to the
computation involved in solving the puzzle. Each pro-
cessor is then assigned to a committee corresponding to
its established identity (say, using the s least significant
bits of the identity). Moreover, each committee processes
a distinct shard based on this s-bit identifier.
2) Overlay Setup: Next is the community discovery step
where processors discover identities of other processors
in their committee by communicating with each other.
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Fig. 1: Conceptual view of a shard-based consensus protocol.
The outcome of this step is a fully-connected overlay for
each committee in the network.
3) Intra-Committee Consensus: Next, processors run a stan-
dard byzantine agreement protocol such as PBFT [12]
within their committees to agree on a set of transactions.
Each committee then sends its consensus set of transac-
tions Bi (or shard) to a final committee for inclusion in
the new block B at the end of current epoch. In order
to be considered by the final committee, each shard Bi
needs to be signed by a simple majority, i.e., by at least
c
2 + 1 processors for a committee of size c.
4) Final Consensus: A final committee (chosen based on a
designated s-bit final committee identifier) then takes the
consensus shards (Bi) from the previous step and merges
these to create a final block B, creates a cryptographic
digest or hash of B and broadcasts it to the rest of the
network. During the merge operation, each processor in
the final committee first validates that each shard Bi
is signed by at least c2 + 1 processors in the correct
committee and then computes a union of all the shards
to form the block B. After each processor in the final
committee computes a union in this fashion, they then
4collectively run a byzantine agreement protocol such as
PBFT [12] to arrive at a consensus on the final block
B. The cryptographic digest of the final consensus block
B needs to be signed by a simple majority of the final
committee before it can be broadcast on the network.
5) Randomness Generation for Next Epoch: In the final
step of the protocol, the final committee generates a
set of random strings and broadcasts it to the network.
These random strings are used by the processors in the
identity creation and committee formation tasks of the
next epoch.
B. Processor Costs
We now characterize the costs (including, computation and
communication costs) borne by the processors in each time
epoch due to their participation in the sharding protocol. It
should be noted that our goal here is not to arrive at a precise
quantification of these costs, rather to characterize them such
that they could be used to analyze the strategic behavior of
processors while participating in the protocol. The protocol
steps in each epoch, as outlined in the previous section,
can be basically grouped into two phases: (1) organization
phase and, (2) committee participation phase. During the
organization phase, the processors create identities using PoW
puzzles, form committees and identify other processors in their
committee (i.e., execute steps 1 and 2 in the protocol above),
whereas in the committee participation phase the processors
validate their respective shards and arrive at an agreement with
other committee members (i.e., execute steps 3, 4 and 5 in the
protocol above).
It should also be clear from the protocol description above
that the organization phase precludes the committee participa-
tion phase, and it is required or mandatory. In other words,
if a processor does not go through the organization phase, it
does not have an identity nor it gets assigned to a committee,
and so it cannot take part in the committee participation
phase. Similarly, it should also be clear that the committee
participation phase is not mandatory for processors, i.e., a
processor could choose to create a verifiable identity and be
assigned to a committee, but may choose not to participate
in tasks such as shard validation and intra-committee consen-
sus. If some processors do not take part in the committee
participation phase, it does not mean that the protocol will
fail. The inherent fault-tolerance of intra-committee consensus
protocols such as PBFT and the simple majority rule employed
in intra-committee voting implies that a certain number of non-
participation can be tolerated by the protocol. For the sake of
convenience, we assume that if more than half (> c2 ) of the
processors within a committee of size c do not participate in
the committee participation phase, the entire protocol for that
epoch fails, i.e., no new block is proposed in that epoch.
Thus, we can characterize the total cost for a processor to
participate in an epoch of the sharding protocol based on the
cost for executing the above two phases. For the organization
phase, let’s assume that a processor bears a cost cm, which we
refer to as the mandatory cost. It should be noted that cm is
a fixed cost and is independent of the number of transactions
processed by the processor. Moreover, as solving the PoW
puzzle is the most significant activity during the organization
phase, cm can be approximated using the current difficulty of
the PoW puzzle and the average computational power of all
the processors.
Accordingly, for executing the committee participation
phase let’s assume that a processor bears an optional cost co,
depending on whether the processor fully participates in it
or not. Unlike the mandatory cost, the optional cost co has
two components: (i) a fixed component and, (ii) a transaction-
dependent component. During the committee participation
phase, a processor performs activities such as participation in
intra-committee consensus the cost of which can be bounded
by a fixed average cost [12]. We represent all these per-
processor fixed costs during the committee participation phase
as cf . Another activity during this phase that all processors are
expected to perform is verifying the validity of all outstanding
transactions (they have received) within their respective shards
by using the validation function V . Depending on the com-
plexity of the validation function V , this can be a significant
cost (to a processor) which also depends on the number of
outstanding transactions being validated. We represent the cost
to validate each transaction using V by cv . Hence, we can
compute the total optional cost coi for a processor Pi as:
coi = c
f + |xji |cv (1)
where xji is the vector of transactions received and validated
by processor Pi. The average per-processor cost (cti) for
participation in each epoch of the shard-based protocol can
thus be characterized as cti = c
m + cf + |xji |cv .
One point that needs further clarification is why a processor
may choose not to execute the committee participation phase
after executing the organization phase. Our rationality assump-
tion, which we describe next, provides this clarification.
C. Rationality Assumption
Earlier research efforts on sharding [8], [10] have assumed
a byzantine adversary where processors controlled by the ad-
versary can be arbitrarily malicious, i.e., malicious processors
could arbitrarily deviate from the correct execution of the
protocol or could arbitrarily drop protocol messages. In this
work, however, we assume that processors are honest but
selfish. In other words, processors do not arbitrarily deviate
from protocol execution or drop protocol messages, but decide
against participation in the protocol only when there is an
incentive (financial or otherwise) to do so. Let us further
provide a brief intuition of the notion of rationality in this
setup. All processors receive some rewards if the protocol
execution in an epoch is successful, for example, in terms
of block rewards, transaction fees, etc. The precise nature
of rewards depend on the specific system or application that
the blockchain protocol enables. Moreover, as discussed in
the earlier section, all processors bear some costs for fully
participating in both phases of the protocol. The total benefit or
payoff received by processors in each epoch is the difference
between the obtained reward and the spent costs in that epoch.
A selfish (or rational) processor will always choose a protocol
5TABLE I: List of Symbols.
Symbol Definition
k Number of shards (or committees)
N Number of processors
xji Vector of received transactions by processor i in shard j
yj Vector of transactions submitted by shard j to Blockchain
c Minimum number of processors in each committee
τ Required number of processors in shard for consensus
r The benefit for each transaction
bi Benefit of processor i after adding the block
cti Total cost of computation for processor i
co Total optional costs in each epoch
cm Mandatory costs in each epoch to enter the shard
cv Cost of transaction verification
cf Fixed costs in optional cost
BR Block Reward
lj Number of cooperative processors in each shard
L Total number of cooperative processors in all shards
C
lj
j The set of all cooperative processors in shard j
D
n−lj
j The set of all defective processors in shard j
CL The set of all cooperative processors
DN−L The set of all defective processors
participation strategy that improves its benefit or payoff. If a
processor does not execute the organization phase, it does not
get any reward as it is not a part of any committee. However, a
rational processor’s strategy could be to execute the organiza-
tion phase but refrain from the committee participation phase.
Such a selfish strategy saves on the optional cost co and may
result in a reward if enough other processors participate fully,
and thus may provide more benefit or payoff to the rational
processor. We assume that a rational processor will always
choose such a selfish strategy which provides more benefit or
payoff, if it exists. In summary, the goal of each processor is
to maximize its individual payoff (received at the end of each
epoch), without maliciously trying to deviate or disrupt the
protocol. We assume that processors do not collude/coordinate
in order to jointly maximize their combined utility.
III. SHARD-BASED BLOCKCHAIN GAME
In this section, we present the game-theoretic aspects of
a shard-based blockchain protocol with multiple processors
in a honest but selfish environment. We first introduce a
non-cooperative N -Player game model that we refer to as
the shard-based blockchain game G. Upon starting an epoch
t, processors must decide whether to collaborate with each
other, verify transactions, and make a block to be appended
to the chain (i.e., take part in the community participation
phase), after the organization phase as we addressed in the
previous section. The key point of the game-theoretic analysis
is to consider the computation costs for processors who
verify transactions and participate in consensus mechanism,
as presented in Section II-B and II-C, and the total benefits
when they agree on a valid block. Therefore, using a game-
theoretic analysis, we investigate whether block generation can
emerge in such a non-cooperative system. By means of our
game model and the related analysis, we would like to show
that with a uniform distribution of rewards in these protocols,
the interactions between processors fall in a category of games,
where there exists a social dilemma of all-defection behavior.
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Fig. 2: In each shard at least τ processors among n processors
must be cooperative to perform consensus algorithm. Each
Shard j submits the final yj vector of transactions to make
the final block.
We then propose a novel reward sharing protocol and address
the conditions for having a new class of equilibrium, where
a subset of processors will be forced to cooperate. Table I
summarizes the notation used throughout the paper.
A. Game Model
Game theory allows for modeling situations of conflict and
for predicting the behavior of participants when they interact
with each other. In our shard-based blockchain game G,
processors must decide upon joining the shards whether to
cooperate and contribute to optional costs (as addressed in
Section II-B) or not. We model the shard-based blockchain
game as a static game, because all processors must choose
their strategy simultaneously, after they have joined the shards.
This modeling decision also keeps our analysis tractable, while
conforming to a simple model of processor rationality. The
game G is defined as a triplet (P,S,U), where P is the set
of players, S is the set of strategies and U is the set of payoff
values. We also assume that at any time epoch t, a game is
played among all the processors in all shards, because the
benefits of successfully adding a block is shared among all
processors.
• Players (P): The set of players P = {Pi}Ni=1 corresponds
to the set of processors who have already joined shards in a
given epoch time t. In fact, all N processors must have already
performed PoW and paid the mandatory costs cm. Considering
the number of shards in our system model, i.e., k, we conclude
that each shard has n = N/k committee members. During this
epoch time in our game, we assume that each processor Pi in
shard j receives the vector xji of transactions to verify and
participate in the consensus algorithm.
As it is shown in Figure 2, we also assume that to perform
a consensus algorithm in each shard we need at least τ
processors who agree on a given list of transactions. For
example, in Elastico protocol which uses PBFT, τ is equal
to 23n. Finally, y
j , j ∈ {1, ..., k} represents the result of
the consensus algorithm including the list of transactions that
would be added to the blockchain by shard j.
• Strategy (S): Each processor Pi can choose between
two moves si: (i) Cooperate C, or (ii) Defect D. Hence the
set of strategies in this game is S = {C,D}. The strategy
6of processor Pi determines whether Pi participates in all
optional tasks presented in Section II or not. In particular,
if processor Pi plays C, it will accept and verify all received
transactions. In this case, it also cooperates in all consensus
algorithms and incurs cost co for its participation. Contrary
to a cooperative behavior, a given processor can refuse all
transaction verifications and simply do nothing during the
community participation phase (i.e., play D).
• Payoff (U): Without loss of generality, we assume that
each transaction will make r benefits, for example in form
of a transaction or some other fee (a similar model exists in
Bitcoin and other popular cryptocurrencies). Hence, the total
benefit that a given shard j can make from transactions is
bj = r|yj |, where yj is the set of verified, signed, and accepted
transactions by shard j. This benefit term r for the network is
some function of the average transaction fee included in the
transactions and number of committee (shard) members that
have processed the transaction. A precise quantification of r is
not trivial and is considered out of scope of this work. Finally,
the total benefits that are made by all transaction fees in the
final appended block can be calculated as TF = r
∑k
j=1 |yj |.
Recall that the total cost of cooperation for processor Pi is
equal to cti = c
m+ coi = c
m+ cf + |xji |cv if the processor acts
honestly and follows the protocol. All processors should pay
the mandatory costs, i.e., cm in order to be in a committee and
finally receive the reward. But they can avoid paying optional
cost co, including the cost of verifications. In summary, we can
divide processors into two groups of cooperative and defective
processors, based on whether they contribute to optional tasks
(i.e., play C and pay ct) or not (i.e., play D and pay only cm).
Let Cljj and Dn−ljj denote the sets of lj cooperating players and
n− lj defecting players in a given shard j with n processors.
Recall that in order to obtain a consensus transaction vector
yj in a given shard j, |Cljj | must be greater than or equal to
τ (|Cljj | ≥ τ ).
After executing the protocol and inserting the computed
block to the blockchain at the end of the epoch, we assume that
the system receives two rewards. This assumption is motivated
from the observation in current public blockchain applications
such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. The first reward is a fixed
reward for adding a new block, called the block reward (BR).
The current block reward for Bitcoin, for example, is 12.5
BTC [13]. The second reward is the sum of transaction fees
which is equal to TF = r
∑k
j=1 |yj |. Note that all following
analyses are based on the assumption that each shard has
already provided a non-empty yj . Due to lack of clarity in
shard-based blockchain proposals [8]–[10], we assume that if
one or more shards fail to provide a yj in an epoch, the system
cannot compute and append a new block in that epoch.
If we assume that all processors receive an equal share of
profits after block computation (i.e., the existing protocol), we
can calculate the reward share for each processor as
BR+ r
∑k
i=1 |yj |
N
.
In other words, all processors receive equal share of the
rewards from block reward and total transaction fees. Hence,
we can compute the payoff of processor Pi in shard j by
uji (C) = bi − cti =
BR+ r
∑k
j=1 |yj |
N
− (cm + cf + |xji |cv),
(2)
if we assume that the processor Pi was cooperative, i.e.
Pi ∈ Cljj . Similarly, if Pi is defective, i.e., Pi ∈ Dn−ljj , its
payoff would be:
uji (D) =
BR+ r
∑k
j=1 |yj |
N
− cm. (3)
Considering the above calculated payoffs, we analyze the
game G next.
B. Game Analysis
In order to get an insight into the strategic behavior of the
processors, we apply the most fundamental game-theoretic
concept, named Nash equilibrium, introduced by John Nash
[14]:
Definition 1. In a Nash equilibrium strategy profile, none of
the players can unilaterally change his strategy to increase his
utility.
In other words, if in a non-cooperative game all strategies
are mutual best responses to each other, then no player has
any motivation to deviate unilaterally from the given strategy
profile. Nash also proved that any finite game has at least one
Nash equilibrium strategy profile. In non-cooperative game
theory, Prisoner’s dilemma or PD, discovered by Flood and
Dresher in 1950 and later formalized by Tucker [15], is
a classical 2-player game which shows why two rational
individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that the
cooperative strategy is more beneficial for both of them (i.e.,
Pareto Optimality). In PD, each individual has two strategies
of cooperation and defection, and the defection strategy strictly
dominates the cooperation strategy. Hence, the only Nash
equilibrium in PD, is a mutual defection.
More than 20 years later, Hamburger defined the analogous
N -player version of PD game in [16]. This extension is called
public good game (PGG). In a PGG setting, each individual
can cooperate and pay a contribution of α or defect and do
not pay anything. Then all contributions would be summed
and multiplied by a reward factor γ > 1. Finally, the total
reward would be distributed among all users equally, whether
they have cooperated or defected. In other words, if n agents
out of N cooperate, their payoff would be γαnN − α and the
defectors’ payoff is γαnN . Indeed, the total payoff of all users
is maximized when everyone contributes to the public good.
However, it has been proved that the Nash equilibrium in this
game is defection by all users. A complete survey of PGGs
and related results is available in [17].
Following our definition for shard-based blockchain game
G, we show in the following theorem that G is a PGG. In other
words, the system fails to make any new block and remain in
the same state if all processors defect initially.
Theorem 1. In each epoch of a shard-based blockchain game
G with N processors, if rewards are equally shared among all
processors, then G reduces to a public goods game.
7Proof. Let us consider the strategy profile where all processors
defect and do not pay optional cost co after joining to the
shards. We call this strategy profile All−D. The payoff of each
processor i would be then ui = −cm. In this case, none of the
processors can unilaterally change his strategy to increase its
payoff. Because, the only cooperative processor cannot obtain
any reward without the contribution of at least τ − 1 other
processors in its shard, as addresses in Section II. In other
words, the new payoff of each processor who deviates would
be −cm − cf − |xji |cv which is indeed smaller than −cm.
Hence, All − D is a Nash equilibrium profile in this game
and G is a PGG.
Theorem 2 further shows that we can never enforce an all-
cooperation strategy (All − C) in the game G, as it is not a
Nash Equilibrium.
Theorem 2. In each epoch of a shard-based blockchain game
G with N processors, if rewards are equally shared among
all processors, we cannot establish All-Cooperation strategy
profile as a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We first assume that all N processors have already
cooperated in transaction verifications (i.e., All − C strategy
profile) and payed the optional cost co. We can compute the
payoff of each processor Pi by Equation (2). Hence, if a given
processor deviates from the cooperation and play defection
unilaterally, its payoff would be equal to Equation (3), which
is always greater than cooperative payoffs at Equation (2).
Hence, each user has incentive to deviate unilaterally and
increases its payoff. Then, the All−C strategy profile is never
a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, Theorem 3 shows the conditions under which we
can enforce an equilibrium in game G, where some processors
cooperate.
Theorem 3. Let Cljj and Dn−ljj denote the sets of lj co-
operating processors and n − lj defecting processors inside
each shard j with n processors. If L =
∑k
j=1 lj is the total
number of cooperative processors, (CL,DN−L) represents a
Nash equilibrium profile in each epoch of the game G, if
and only if lj = τ in all shards j, where CL =
⋃
j Cljj and
DN−L = ⋃j Dn−ljj .
Proof. If in all shards, there exist exactly lj = τ cooperative
processors, any cooperative processor cannot deviate unilater-
ally to increase its payoff. Because, the deviation will remove
yj transaction fees from the benefits and consequently its
payoff would be decreased. In the worst case, the system could
even potentially fail to add a new block to the chain and all
benefits would be zero. Moreover, similar to previous cases,
there is no incentive to deviate for defective processors, since
they must pay an extra charge for their cooperation, while this
will not change the result of the consensus algorithm.
The above theorems prove that if rewards are uniformly
distributed among processors, a cooperative equilibria cannot
be enforced in shard-based public permissionless blockchains.
Hence, in the following section we define a new reward sharing
approach, which promotes cooperation among processors by
providing appropriate incentives.
C. Fair Reward Sharing
In this section, we extend our game model to include a
fair reward sharing approach, where each processor receives
a reward if and only if it has already cooperated with other
processors within the shard. Let’s call this new game GF , in
which the payoff of cooperative processors in set Clj is
uji (C) =
BR
klj
+
r|yj |
lj
− (cm + cf + |xji |cv), (4)
Recall that we assume lj ≥ τ for the consensus algorithm
and each shard j will submit a non-empty yj set to the
blockchain. Analysis of the case where the processors cannot
make a consensus on a given vector of transactions can be
easily extended from our model, by assigning BR and r a
value of zero (no benefits). As Equation (4) shows, we first
assume that the BR is uniformly distributed among shards and
each cooperative processor can receive a share of it. Moreover,
each shard j receives all fees for all transactions that it has
submitted to the blockchain. Then, in each shard this reward
is uniformly distributed among all cooperative processors. It
is worth mentioning that |xji | may not always be equal to |yj |.
It means that a processor Pi might be cooperative but finally
all other processors may agree on a vector of transactions yj
that is different from xji . Thus, contrary to the standard shard-
based protocols, in GF the defective processors’ payoff can
be calculated as
uDi = −cm, (5)
because the defective processors will not receive any benefit.
It is easy to show that the conditions of Theorem 1 still hold in
the new game GF and the game GF is PGG. However, we can
show that in this newly defined game G, it is easier to enforce
users to cooperate at a Nash equilibrium profile. We derive
the conditions under which there exists a cooperative Nash
equilibrium profile in game GF , with the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let Cljj and Dn−ljj denote the sets of lj co-
operating processors and n − lj defecting processors inside
each shard j with n processors, respectively. (CL,DN−L)
represents a Nash equilibrium profile in each epoch of game
GF , if the following conditions are satisfied:
1) In all shards j, lj ≥ τ .
2) If for a given processor Pi in shard j, x
j
i = y
j , then
the number of transactions |xji | must be greater than
θ1c =
cf−BRklj
r/lj−cv
3) If for a given processor Pi in shard j, x
j
i 6= yj , then
the number of transactions |xji | must be smaller than
θ2c =
BR
klj
+
r|yj |
lj
−cf
cv .
Proof. The number of cooperative processors must be greater
that the consensus threshold τ , otherwise the cooperative
processors will not receive any transaction and block reward
benefits for their cooperation. Hence, they can increase their
payoff by unilaterally deviating from cooperative strategy.
8We now find the largest group of cooperative processors lj
in each shard, where no processor in Dn−ljj can join Cljj to
increase its payoff. Let’s assume that l∗j is this largest set of
processors. If processor P ji is among the set of cooperative
processors, then it will not unilaterally deviate if its payoff
(calculated by Equation (4)) is greater than −cm. Two possible
cases could happen in this case. First, P ji could be among
processors who have the same vector of transactions as the
output of the shard, i.e., xji = y
j . In this case, P ji will not
deviate from cooperation if:
BR
klj
+
r|xji |
lj
− (cm + cf + |xji |cv) ≥ −cm, (6)
which shows that xji ≥ θ1c , where
θ1c =
cf − BRklj
r/lj − cv .
In the second case, processor P ji have cooperated with
others in Cljj , but its vector of transactions is different from
the output of the shard, i.e., xji 6= yj . Hence, the following
condition must be satisfy if this user wants to remain in the
cooperative set.
BR
klj
+
r|yj |
lj
− (cm + cf + |xji |cv) ≥ −cm, (7)
which shows that xji < θ
2
c , where
θ2c =
BR
klj
+ r|y
j |
lj
− cf
cv
.
If l∗j represents the largest set of cooperative processors in
each shard, then (CL,DN−L) would be the unique cooperative
Nash equilibrium of the game GF . Please note that this NE
is a unique cooperative equilibrium of the game, as we have
already found the largest set of cooperative processors in all
shards.
Note that by increasing the optional costs of computation
(whether cf is in the numerator or cv in denominator of θC)
and for any given number of transactions |xji |, processors
will be tempted to be more defective as the threshold θ1c
will be increased. This is in line with our intuition that
processors are not cooperative if the cost of cooperation is
high. On the other hand, the calculated threshold shows that by
increasing the number of processors N and consequently the
number of shards k, the processors would be more defective.
This is representing the case where the processors will not
cooperate in the hope that other processors will participate
in the transaction verifications and other optional tasks in
the defined protocol. Moreover, as the reward is smaller, the
processor must obtain more benefits from the transaction fees
to have positive payoff. In other words, cooperative processors
have less incentives to cooperate, because the number of
participants is more and they will receive smaller reward.
Recall that the game GF is still a social dilemma game,
but with the new reward distribution approach we can provide
enough incentives to enable processor cooperation. Our re-
sults in this section showed that a shard-based permissionless
blockchain protocol could be potentially a PGG and processors
could remain in All−D equilibrium without any reward. We
also showed that the cooperation can be enforced under some
conditions where the number of transactions are large enough
for the processors. Next we apply the results from Theorem 4
to design an incentive-compatible sharding protocol for public
permissionless blockchain.
Algorithm 1 Incentive-Compatible Protocol
procedure INITIALIZATION AND COMMITTEE CREATION
ID, Shard← ComputeID(epochRandomness, IP, PK)
xi ← ShardTransactions(Shard)
end procedure
5: procedure COOPERAIVE/DEFECTIVE NODE SELECTION
Pi sends H(x
j
i ) to Coordinator
if Coordinator then
Receive H(xji )s
lj ← Maximum number of processors with
10: common transactions
if lj < τ then
return All −D
else
Prepare the list of lj processors Cljj
15: Calculate θ1c and θ
2
c from Theorem 4
return θ1c , θ2c , and C
lj
j
end if
end if
end procedure
20: procedure SHARD PARTICIPATION (CONSENSUS)
if Pi ∈ Cljj and |xji | ≤ θ1c then
return Defect
else if Pi /∈ Cljj and |xji | ≥ θ2c then
return Defect
25: end if
Verify transactions and create a set of verified transactions yj by all
remaining cooperative processors
Consensus on verified transactions
Sign BFT agreement result
return Signature, Agreed block’s header
30: end procedure
procedure VERIFICATION, REWARD, AND PUNISHMENT
Verify whether Pi ∈ CL have cooperated in each shard
Distribute rewards among cooperative Pi according to
Equation (4)
35: end procedure
IV. INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE REWARD SHARING
As discussed earlier, in any shard-based protocol, processors
may not have enough incentives to cooperate and verify
transactions, which leads them to a social-dilemma. In other
words, the decision of each processor (to cooperate or defect)
exclusively depends on the number of received transactions
compared to a fixed threshold. Our game-theoretic evaluation
allows us to design a more sophisticated protocol - the
incentive-compatible reward sharing - that extends current
shard-based protocols by considering optimal strategies of
processors and enforcing cooperation in these protocols. The
incentive-compatible reward sharing protocol is based on our
results for fair reward distributions presented in Section III.
Algorithm 1 outlines the main steps of our proposed pro-
tocol. Comparing to the standard shard-based protocols, the
main difference of our proposed incentive-compatible protocol
is that we first announce to processors whether the cooperation
9would be in their interests. The protocol proceeds as follows.
The processors first try to solve the PoW puzzle and obtain an
ID to participate in a committee. After committee formation
and assignment, each processor Pi in shard j receives a list
of xji transactions to verify.
At this stage, all processors calculate the H(xji ) and submit
it to a coordinator, where H is a predefined hash function.
Note that the coordinator could be potentially one of the
processors that has been selected randomly in each shard.
This coordinator could be a centralized trusted third party as
well, as it does not receive any sensitive information. The
coordinator then finds the maximum subset of processors with
similar H(xji ). This will estimate lj and Cljj , which will be
then used to calculate the θ1c and θ
2
c .
As described in Algorithm 1, the incentive-compatible pro-
tocol assists processors in selecting the optimal strategy in a
given epoch. We assume that the set of cooperative processors
Cljj and the set of defective processors Dn−ljj are publicly
announced in each shard. In each epoch, the protocol defines
publicly which rational processor must cooperate or defect,
by considering the number of received transactions by all
processors and based on the results in Theorem 4. At the end
of committee participation phase, it is easy to verify if a given
processor Pi has already followed the recommendations by the
incentive-compatible protocol or they have deviated from the
defined strategies. In case a processor in Cljj has not cooperated
in this phase, the incentive-compatible protocol will not give
this processor any reward at the end of this epoch. This is
also a novel punishment approach that has been added to our
proposed protocol compared to previous ones.
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
We conduct a comprehensive set of numerical simulations,
in order to validate how our proposed incentive-compatible
protocol compares with uniform and fair reward sharing pro-
tocols in shard-based blockchains. We first detail the experi-
mental setup used to simulate a basic shard-based blockchain
in Section V-A. Variants of the simulation were used to analyze
multiple parameters that may affect the strategy of individual
processors, and thereby its effect on the successful operation
of the blockchain network.
A. Experimental Setup
We simulate a shard-based public permissionless blockchain
with approximately N (±1%) processors that are selfishly
following a protocol to reach consensus in each shard, then
combine all shards to add the next block, and finally collect
their reward at the end of each epoch. We assume committees
of size 100 (±1%), and the required number of processors
in each shard for consensus is τ ≈ 51. Also, the number of
committees (and shards) grow linearly w.r.t. the number of
processors in the network (k ≈ N100 ). Each processor in the
network is assumed to receive |xji | ≈ |yj | (±1%) transactions
corresponding to the shard it belongs to. As imperfect views
of the network is common occurrence in real-world networks,
we also assume that the number of processors with xji 6= yj is
approximately 15%. We present mean results of 100 iterations
for each combination of parameters (in Figures 3-6), i.e., every
point in the graphs was obtained after averaging the results of
100 independent epochs with that particular set of parameters.
B. Number of Transactions
We first analyze the effect of varying the average number of
transactions |xji | between 500 and 15000. The corresponding
ratios of cooperative and defective processors is plotted in
Figure 3. As intuitive, the uniform reward sharing results in
all defect (Figure 3a), and thus no block is ever added to the
blockchain. In case of fair and incentive-compatible reward
sharing protocols (Figure 3b and 3c, respectively) we observe
that processors opt for all defect strategy when the number
of transactions is low, but eventually change their strategy
to cooperate as the number of transactions gets high enough
to make a profit. More importantly, the proposed incentive-
compatible reward sharing protocol achieves a majority of
cooperative processors for lesser number of transaction than
in the case of fair sharing, which is favorable.
C. Block Reward
We next analyze the effect of varying the block reward
BR between 1000 and 7000, and the corresponding ratios of
cooperative and defective processors is plotted in Figure 4. As
before, the uniform reward sharing results in all defect (Figure
4a), regardless of the value of the block reward. In case of fair
and incentive-compatible reward sharing protocols (Figure 4b
and 4c, respectively) we observe that processors opt for all
defect strategy when the block reward is low, but eventually
change their strategy to cooperate as the block reward gets
high enough to make a profit. Again, the proposed incentive-
compatible reward sharing protocol achieves a majority of
cooperative processors for lesser valued block reward than in
the case of fair sharing, which is favorable.
D. Size of the Network
The number of processors in the network in a given epoch
can vastly impact the strategy for individual processors, be-
cause if a small reward is shared between a large number of
cooperative processors, it may not cover other costs associated
with participation (such as cf ). We observe this intuition
in effect in Figure 5, where N is varied between 100 and
6000. Both the proposed incentive-compatible and fair reward
sharing protocols lose majority of cooperative processors when
N is increased significantly. However, the proposed incentive-
compatible reward sharing protocol retains a majority of
cooperative processors for greater number of processors than
in the case of fair sharing, which is desirable. As before,
the uniform reward sharing results in all defect (Figure 5a),
regardless of the number of processors.
In order to better understand why cooperative processors
flip to being defective, we also plotted the corresponding
weighted utility of processors in Figure 6. In case of both
fair and incentive-compatible protocols, the average utility
drops significantly with increasing number of processors. The
average utility gradually converges at about −cm (which is
10
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Fig. 3: Ratio of cooperative and defective processors for different sizes of yj .
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Fig. 4: Ratio of cooperative and defective processors for different values of BR.
−10 in our simulation). As utility by cooperation drops below
−cm, processors flip to being defective and incur only −cm.
Also, in uniform reward sharing we see a constant −cm utility
for all (defective) processors.
E. Discussion and Limitations
Our goal in this work was to design practical incen-
tive mechanisms for eliciting cooperation in shard-based
blockchains. The above analytical and empirical results shows
how our proposed reward sharing mechanism promotes co-
operation in shard-based blockchains, and thwarts free-riding
processors. Nonetheless, there exists certain limitations in the
proposed mechanism, discussed below, some of which we plan
to address in the future.
Inter-Shard Communication. Due to the lack of commu-
nication between committees, cooperative processors in a
shard where consensus is reached, can suffer when another
committee fails to reach consensus (because no block is added
to the blockchain if one or more shards fail). This can be
resolved if an inter-shard communication is established in
Algorithm 1, wherein coordinators can exchange consensus
status and inform potentially cooperative processors about the
state of consensus in other shards as well. We plan to include
inter-shard communication in our future work, and analyze
how the game changes due to it.
Inclusion of Malicious Processors. In this work we consider
only honest but greedy (or selfish) processors (each trying
to maximize its utility) who would follow the instructions of
a coordinator. However in real-world, malicious processor(s)
may also exist whose sole objective may be to disrupt the
blockchain network. Such malicious processors may misbe-
have at various stages of the protocol, such as reporting false
H(xji ) or not following coordinator’s instruction to cooperate
(or defect). As part of our future work, we plan to include
malicious processors in the game and re-analyze the game.
Parametric Values. The parametric values chosen for our
numerical analysis was primarily to showcase the trends ob-
servable across the three different reward sharing mechanisms.
They may or may not be reflective of values in a real shard-
based blockchain network, but we did our best to establish the
inequalities between parameters as completely as possible.
VI. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly outline the efforts in the liter-
ature towards improving the scalability and transaction rate
of consensus protocols in public permissionless blockchains.
For an exhaustive survey of blockchain consensus protocols
in the literature, readers are referred to [18]. The original
Nakamoto consensus protocol [1] of Bitcoin which employed a
leader selection using PoW puzzles (to commit the next block)
suffered from poor scalability and transaction throughput.
Bitcoin-NG [6] attempted to improve Bitcoin’s performance
by employing microblocks. In Bitcoin-NG, similar to Bitcoin,
a leader is selected using PoW in each epoch. However,
unlike Bitcoin, the leader can continue to append microblocks
(containing transactions) to the blockchain for the duration of
its epoch, until a new leader is elected.
As leader or single node based (implicit) consensus al-
gorithms such as Nakamoto consensus and Bitcoin-NG still
suffer from poor performance, fault-tolerance and consistency
issues, the community’s focus shifted on designing blockchain
consensus protocols using a committee of nodes, rather than
a single node (or leader). While committee-based consensus
algorithms were introduced more than two decades ago [19],
much recently Decker et al. [20] proposed one of the first
committee-based consensus protocols for public blockchains,
11
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Fig. 5: Ratio of cooperative and defective processors for different values of N .
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Fig. 6: Weighted average utility of cooperative and defective processors for different values of N .
named PeerCensus. However, PeerCensus did not clarify how
committee formation is done and how an honest majority can
be ensured within the committee. Follow up works [21]–[24]
in similar direction improved the practicality of such single
committee-based consensus protocols by proposing different
strategies on how unbiased committees can be formed.
Although single committee consensus algorithms provide
significantly improved performance compared to single node
or leader-based consensus algorithms, one major limitation
of such techniques is that they do not scale well. Moreover,
increasing committee size in such techniques comes at the
expense of a decreased throughput. This motivated the de-
sign of blockchain consensus protocols that employ multiple
committees. The main idea in these protocols is to split the
transactions among multiple committees (or shards), which
then process these shards or set of transactions in parallel. This
also improves the overall scalability of the system. RSCoin
[25] was proposed as a shard-based blockchain technique for
centrally-banked cryptocurrencies, while Elastico [8] was the
first shard-based consensus protocol for public blockchains.
Omniledger [10] and Rapidchain [9] are some of the recently
proposed shard-based public blockchain protocols that attempt
to address the scalability and security issues of Elastico. De-
spite the recent interest in shard-based protocols for improving
transaction throughput and scalability in public blockchains,
there have been no prior efforts in the literature, until this
one, that study the rational behavior of processors or miners
in such a multiple committee approach.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we comprehensively studied the problem of
selfishness in shard-based permissionless blockchains. We first
introduced a system model to capture the main operational pa-
rameters in current shard-based blockchain protocols. Next, we
evaluated the strategic behavior of processors in such protocols
by employing concepts from game theory. Specifically, we
modeled shard-based blockchain protocols as n-player non-
cooperative games using different reward sharing scenarios
and obtain the Nash equilibria (NE) strategy profile for each
scenario. Based on our analytical results under different reward
sharing scenarios, we designed an incentive mechanism for
shard-based blockchain protocols which would enforce coop-
eration among processors by guaranteeing optimal incentive
distribution. Our numerical analysis also validated that the pro-
posed reward sharing mechanism outperforms uniform reward
sharing and provides more incentive for cooperation when the
block reward or number of transactions is small. This work is
the first step towards a deeper understanding of the effect of
non-cooperative behavior in shard-based blockchains.
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